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RISKY BUSINESS: THE CREDIT CRISIS AND 
FAILURE (PART I) 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa* 
INTRODUCTION 
The credit crisis represents a watershed event for global financial mar-
kets and has been linked to significant declines in real economy perfor-
mance on a level of magnitude not experienced since World War II.1  
Recognition of the crisis in 2008 has been followed in 2009 and 2010 by a 
plethora of competing proposals in response to the credit crisis.2  The result 
has been a cacophony of visions, voices, and approaches.  The sheer noise 
that has ensued threatens to drown out the fundamental core questions that 
should be asked about the credit crisis.  Among the most important are 
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1
  See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: CRISIS AND RECOVERY xii 
(2009), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf (―[G]lobal activity is projected to 
contract by 1.3 percent in 2009[, which] represents the deepest post–World War II recession by 
far. . . . [T]he downturn is truly global: output per capita is projected to decline in countries representing 
three-quarters of the global economy.‖). 
2
  A wide range of proposals for financial services industry reform has arisen in the midst of the cre-
dit crisis, including two separate proposals from the Department of the Treasury under the Bush and Ob-
ama administrations and a number of legislative proposals.  See, e.g., The Wall Street Transparency & 
Accountability Act of 2010, S. ___, 111th Cong. (2010) (bill number not yet assigned at time of publica-
tion) (link); Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. (2009) (link); 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009) (link); Pri-
vate Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 3818, 111th Cong. (2009) (link); Private 
Fund Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1276, 111th Cong. (2009) (link); Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 
2009, S. 344, 111th Cong. (2009) (link); Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 711, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (link); Dep‘t of Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure 
(2008) (hereinafter Treasury Blueprint) (link); DEP‘T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
REFORM—A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009) 
(HEREINAFTER TREASURY 2009 REFORM PROPOSAL) (link). 
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The credit crisis can be viewed as a type of financial market network 
failure.3  The credit crisis underscores the complex and linked nature of 
contemporary financial markets, as well as the inherent difficulties regula-
tors and industry participants face in managing complex and interconnected 
risks.  The credit crisis also demonstrates that neither industry participants 
nor regulators fully apprehended underlying financial market risks.  In re-
cent years, financial products and financial markets have become increa-
singly complex and global.4  Although public commentary and policy 
discussions in the credit crisis aftermath focused on the implications of fi-
nancial services firms that are ―too big to fail,‖5 existing commentary de-
votes less attention to the network-like characteristics of financial markets 
and the implications of complex networks for financial markets.6  The im-
pact of financial market networks is heightened by the pervasive cultures of 
trading and risk-taking that now characterize many market segments.7  The 
risk-taking associated with financial market trading activities is perhaps 
best illustrated by cases of individual traders who took on risky trading po-
sitions that significantly compromised or, in the case of Baring Brothers, 
destroyed the firms on whose account they trade.8 
Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives illustrate both financial innovation 
and the links that connect financial market participants, such as traders.  De-





  See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Financial Markets and Networks—Implications for Financial Market 
Regulation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (on file with author). 
4
  See, e.g., COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GROUP III (CRMPG III), CONTAINING SYSTEMIC 
RISK: THE ROAD TO REFORM 4 (2008) (noting that for structural, technological, and behavioral reasons 
―contemporary finance has become incredibly complex‖) (link); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Trading Plac-
es: Securities Regulation, Market Crisis, and Network Risk 7 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Series, Working Paper No. 09-01, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324951 (discussing implications of the ―complexi-
ty and pace of innovation in global financial markets‖) [hereinafter Arewa, Trading Places] (link).  
5
  In January 2010, for example, President Obama proposed yet another Wall Street reform plan that 
would limit the size and activities of the kinds of institutions that in the past were considered ―too big to 
fail.‖  Press Release, White House, Office of Press Sec‘y, President Obama Calls for New Restrictions 




  Arewa, Trading Places, supra note 4, at 7, 18–23. 
7
  Id. 
8
  See Ian Greener, Nick Leeson and the Collapse of Barings Bank: Socio-Technical Networks and 
the ‘Rogue Trader’, 13 ORG. 421 (2006) (discussing Nick Leeson and how his unauthorized and risky 
trades led to the collapse of his employer Barings Brothers in 1995); see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, The 
Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127 (2009) (discussing instances of rogue traders and the losses 
such traders generated for their firms) (link). 
9
  Myron S. Scholes, Derivatives in a Dynamic Environment, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 350, 364 (1998) 
(noting that derivatives ―have become essential mechanisms in the tool kit of financial innovation‖). 
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―enabled a far greater degree of linkage across markets than at any other 
time.‖10 
Private legal rules, often specified in form documents, are typically in-
corporated into OTC derivatives contracts.11  OTC derivatives are traded 
through private contracts between parties based on form agreements that 
permit customization for particular transactional terms.  In contrast, ex-
change-traded derivatives, such as futures and options on futures, are traded 
and cleared through standardized contracts and bought and sold in orga-
nized derivatives exchanges.12  OTC derivatives markets exemplify the 
complexity and trading in financial markets.13  OTC derivatives are now key 
building blocks in global financial markets, with a gross market value of 
$25 trillion and notional value of $605 trillion in June 2009.14 
Not surprisingly, the character and complexity of financial markets 
were major factors in the industry and regulatory failures that preceded the 
credit crisis.  In the aftermath of the credit crisis, however, failure is often 
discussed in connection with the financial services companies that many 
blame for the crisis.  Although blame can and certainly should fall on pro-
fessional financial market participants, other failures, including those by 
regulators, have also played a significant role in the credit crisis.  Further, 
U.S. financial market regulation frameworks have not kept pace with finan-
cial innovation.  As a result, regulators often are unable to provide adequate 
risk oversight for the complex trading and other activities that increasingly 





  MOHAMED EL-ERIAN, WHEN MARKETS COLLIDE: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE AGE OF 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC CHANGE 141 (2008). 
11
  Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation?, 
in PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 213, 216 (Robert E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., Brookings-
Wharton 2002) (link). 
12
  Randall Dodd, The Structure of OTC Derivatives Markets, 9 FINANCIER 1–2 (2002) (link).   
13
  Garry J. Schinasi, R. Sean Craig, Burkhard Drees & Charles Kramer, Modern Banking and OTC 
Derivatives Markets: The Transformation of Global Finance and its Implications for Systemic Risk 3, 6 
(Int‘l Monetary Fund Occasional Paper 203, 2000) (noting that the dynamics of modern finance are  
much more complex than those of traditional banking deposit markets and that ―[b]ecause each deriva-
tives portfolio is composed of positions in a wide variety of markets, the network of credit exposures is 
inherently complex and difficult to manage‖). 
14
  BANK FOR INT‘L SETTLEMENTS (BIS), BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND 
FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 22 (Dec. 2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0912.htm 
(link).  Notional amounts reflect the principal value of the underlying assets on which the derivative is 
based, represent a measure of market size, and serve as a reference point for determining contractual 
payments.  BIS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE FIRST HALF OF 2008 at 4 (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0811.pdf  [hereinafter BIS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET] (link).  Notion-
al amounts, however, are not typically exchanged, U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL 
DERIVATIVES—ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 28 n.7 (1994) (link), and do not 
represent a true measure of risk.  Instead, the gross market value of derivatives, which measures the cost 
of replacing all existing contracts, is a better measure of market risk.  BIS, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET 
at 4–5. 
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Rhetorically bashing financial institutions has become commonplace 
among the media, public officials, regulatory agencies and the general pub-
lic.15  A focus on blaming financial institutions, however, deflects attention 
from other failures that contributed to the credit crisis.16  Further, few dis-
cussions focus to a sufficient extent on dealing with the industry and regula-
tory failures that led to the credit crisis.  The credit crisis aftermath could be 
seen as actually rewarding those most responsible for the failure to manage 
or regulate risky financial market business activities.  Through programs 
such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)17 and the Public-Private 
Investment Program (PPIP),18 which are government initiatives to address 
problems resulting from the presence of ―illiquid and troubled assets on fi-
nancial institutions‘ balance sheets,‖19 industry participants received gov-
ernment bailouts that permitted them to avoid assuming the full risk of their 
activities.20  The bailouts have thus rewarded risk management failures by 
averting firm failure, which presents the same significant moral hazard im-





  David Reilly, Banker Bashing Gives Cover to Far Bigger Culprits, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 6, 
2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=columnist_reilly&sid=akQHGe4jT8fs 
(Banker bashing ―satisfies the populist need for an identifiable villain in the financial cri-
sis[,] . . . provides an outlet for our collective anger[,] . . . [and] absolves us from thinking about just 
how we—the credit-card-loving, mortgage-craving, debt-addicted consumers of America—helped fo-
ment the meltdown.‖) (link). 
16
  Anne-Sylvaine Chassany & Eric Schatzker, Blackstone CEO Says Banker Bashing Risks Recov-
ery (Update 3), BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Jan. 28, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-
28/blackstone-ceo-says-banker-bashing-risks-recovery-update3-.html (link). 
17
  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, § 101, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767–
3768 (2008) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to establish TARP and describing TARP) (link); 
see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Buying Troubled Assets, 26 YALE J. REG. 343 (2009) (describing Bush and 
Obama administration plans for dealing with the credit crisis that addressed problems related to illiquid 
bank troubled assets); Randall D. Guynn, Annette L. Nazareth & Margaret E. Tahyar, Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act: The Original Vision, in DAVIS POLK FIN. CRISIS MANUAL 41–58 (2009) (de-
scribing the original understanding of the bill authorizing the creation of TARP). 
18
  John L. Douglas, Yukako Kawata, Margaret E. Tahyar & Danforth Townley, The Public-Private 
Investment Program, in DAVIS POLK FIN. CRISIS MANUAL 181–206 (2009) (describing PPIP) (link); see 
also Bebchuk, supra note 17 (describing Bush and Obama administration plans for dealing with the cre-
dit crisis that addressed problems related to illiquid bank troubled assets). 
19
  Douglas et al., supra note 18, at 181. 
20
  See Jonathan Macey, Obama and the ‘Fat Cat Bankers’, WSJ.COM,  Jan. 12, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704081704574652622742100550.html (―But we must 
get out of the business of guaranteeing against failure.  The bankers and the shareholders who enjoy the 
rewards of risk-taking should be made to act like real capitalists: They should be required to assume the 
risks that go along with the banks‘ business activities.‖) (link). 
21
  See Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
183 (2009) (attributing the credit crisis to systemic moral hazards in risk-taking) (link). 
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Bailouts reflect recognition of the networked nature of financial mar-
kets today and the potential systemic impact of firm failures.22  Because 
failure is an important market mechanism, however, preventing failed firms 
from actually failing serves to obscure the fact that failure may be both ne-
cessary and desirable.23  Further, although deregulation played a role in the 
credit crisis, lax regulation and regulatory failure also contributed to the 
credit crisis.24  As is the case with failed industry participants, regulators 
may also be rewarded for their failures by being given greater regulatory re-
sponsibility.25  Financial market reform proposals would benefit from taking 
better account of the implications of the widespread failures of varied mar-
ket participants and regulators and focusing to a greater extent on regulatory 
effectiveness as both a goal and a metric by which to measure regulatory 
success. 
This Essay analyzes the institutional and legal implications of cultures 
of trading.  It discusses the implications of cultures of trading and considers 
regulatory reforms that such cultures of trading make necessary.  This Es-
say also recommends adoption of regulatory approaches that focus on pre-
vention of future failures rather than approaches geared toward preventing 
past failures.  An approach that intends to avert future failures should in-
clude a number of elements designed to ameliorate risk.  A key element in 
such an approach would entail development of mechanisms that force mar-
ket participants to bear the risks of their activities.  Potential approaches 
could involve varied means, such as insurance, industry bailout pools, and 
improved industry risk management.  These internal industry regulatory in-
itiatives should be part of an overall regulatory approach that focuses on 
developing financial market firewalls to contain the impact of participant 
failures.  Averting future major financial market failures will also require 
fundamentally rethinking U.S. regulatory approaches and implementing 
regulatory principles that guide regulatory enactment and reform.  These 





  See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Financial Firewalls: The Credit Crisis and Network Con-
tagion, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 305, 321 (2010) (noting the interconnectedness of financial firms 
in today‘s financial markets). 
23
  Alex J. Pollock, Is a ‘Systemic Risk Regulator’ Possible?, AMERICAN.COM, May 12, 2009, 
http://www.american.com/archive/2009/may-2009/is-a-2018systemic-risk-regulator2019-possible 
(―[T]he failure of individual firms is not only necessary, but in the systemic sense, desirable.‖) (link). 
24
  Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk Through Securitiza-
tion: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327 (2009) (detailing the 
chronology of deregulation and subsequent failure to enforce existing regulations that led to the credit 
crisis) (link); id. at 1366 (―In sum, deregulation and federal regulators‘ subsequent failure to exercise 
their traditional oversight powers laid the foundation for the underpricing of risk and the erosion in lend-
ing standards.‖). 
25
  Edward L. Glaeser, A Failure of Regulation, Not Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG, June 
9, 2009, 06:00 EST, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/a-failure-of-regulation-not-
capitalism/ (―But it is foolish to react to a governmental failure and think that the right response is to 
vastly increase the scope of public activity.‖) (link). 
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frameworks that are efficient, effective, flexible, transparent and neutral.  
Ensuring better education of market participants, regulators, and most im-
portantly investors, should also be a core goal of financial market regula-
tion.  Finally, the global and complex nature of financial markets requires 
regulation based to the greatest extent possible on actual market dynamics, 
which entails better collection and analysis of relevant data that can then be 
used by participants and regulators to avoid future financial market melt-
downs. 
I. INDUSTRY RISK MANAGEMENT FAILURES 
A. The Credit Crisis and Downside Risks of Financial Market Innovation 
In the second half of 2008, credit markets became increasingly illiquid, 
with the U.S. emerging as the epicenter of a global financial contagion that 
was precipitated by the unraveling of U.S. housing markets.26  Financial in-
stitutions throughout the world had exposure to U.S. housing markets,27 in 
part through credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs).28  Other market participants, including monoline bond insurers and 
insurance companies such as American International Group, Inc. (AIG), re-
tained significant exposure to CDOs by virtue of another type of credit de-
rivative, credit default swaps (CDSs).29  Companies used CDSs to insure 
payment streams for CDOs and other financial instruments.30  Securitization 
has contributed to trends in general financial markets towards cultures of 
trading by enabling transformation of assets that were previously not traded 
and remained on individual companies‘ balance sheets into financial in-





  SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL 
STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 158–60 (2010); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: 
HOW TODAY‘S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 101 (2008). 
27
  JOAO GARCIA & SERGE GOOSSENS, THE ART OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES: DEMYSTIFYING THE 
BLACK SWAN 183 (2010) (―the credit crunch was ignited by the subprime mortgage-backed securities in 
the portfolios of financial institutions‖). 
28
  See generally Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1020–21 (2007) (describing credit derivatives and CDOs and noting their ―in-
creasingly important and controversial‖ role in financial markets). 
29
  Arvind Rajan, A Primer on Credit Default Swaps, in THE STRUCTURED CREDIT HANDBOOK 17, 
17 (Arvind Rajan, Glen McDermott & Ratul Roy eds., 2007) (―A credit default swap . . . is a contract in 
which the buyer of default protection pays a fee, typically quarterly or semiannually, to the seller of de-
fault protection on a reference entity, in exchange for a payment in case of a defined credit event such as 
a default.‖) (footnote omitted) (link). 
30
  See James Surowiecki, Bonds Unbound, NEWYORKER.COM, Feb. 11, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/02/11/080211ta_talk_surowiecki (link); infra Part II 
notes 127–132 and accompanying text. 
31
  See Arewa, Trading Places, supra note 4, at 11–13. 
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By creating liquid secondary trading markets for assets such as home 
mortgages that in the past remained on individual financial institution bal-
ance sheets, credit derivatives have enabled the spread of credit risk to a 
broad range of investors throughout the world.32  Investors purchasing credit 
derivatives, including a wide range of global financial institutions, relied to 
a significant extent on existing relationships with financial institutions that 
structure, market, and sell such derivatives.  These investors also relied on 
privately generated ratings issued by gatekeepers such as credit rating agen-
cies, which play a crucial verification and certification function in fixed in-
come markets.  Many structured finance instruments were actually far 
riskier than their ratings might have suggested.  As a result, flaws in credit 
rating agency assessments of structured finance instruments often are con-
sidered a principal underlying cause of the credit crisis. 
As the credit crisis unfolded, uncertainty about the valuation of credit 
derivatives and other assets on financial institutions‘ balance sheets contri-
buted to a liquidity crunch that exacerbated the impact of the crisis.33  This 
liquidity crunch significantly constrained secondary markets for structured 
finance securities in ways that many market participants and regulators 
failed to anticipate. 
The credit crisis highlights pervasive failures in industry and regulatory 
risk management.  Information and communications technologies, finance 
theory, and financial engineering facilitated development of derivatives 
markets34 and played a role in the risk management of complex financial in-
struments.35  However, rather than spreading risk prior to the credit crisis, 
financial market innovations tended to hide risk by complicating it.36  The 
seeming ability to quantify and price risk underscores a conceptual shift in 
attitudes about risk, which may have contributed to the credit crisis.37  The 
rise of so-called ―quants‖ on Wall Street led to the era of complex financial 





  GARCIA & GOOSSENS, supra note 27, at 183 (discussing the systemic risk implications of inves-
tors‘ substituting a single name bond for a securitization note, which substitutes idiosyncratic with sys-
temic risk). 
33
  See Donald MacKenzie, End-of-the-World Trade, 30 LONDON REV. BOOKS 24, 24–26 (2008), 
available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n09/donald-mackenzie/end-of-the-world-trade (describing the loss 
of reliable facts to form the basis for trades and its exacerbation of the credit crisis) (link). 
34
  PATTERSON, supra note 26, at 140, 166, 204. 
35
  See, e.g., Bill Maurer, Repressed Futures: Financial Derivatives’ Theological Unconscious, 31 
ECON. & SOC‘Y 15, 21 (2002) (noting that Black Scholes ―fostered a tremendous expansion in the op-
tions market, because it seemed to allow a sure method for options pricing and an investment strategy 
based on using options to hedge against risk‖); Stephen M. Schaefer, Robert Merton, Myron Scholes and 
the Development of Derivative Pricing, 100 SCAND. J. ECON. 425, 425–26, 441–443 (1998) (noting the 
impact of the Black-Scholes model on the development of the financial services industry). 
36
  MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 74 (2010). 
37
  See Donald MacKenzie & Yuval Millo, Constructing a Market, Performing Theory: The Histori-
cal Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange, 109 AM. J. SOC. 107, 136 (2003) (discussing the 
―mathematicized risk-evaluation culture of the contemporary world‖). 
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nancial market networks that characterized financial markets at the time of 
the credit crisis.38 
The activities of quants are exemplified by the rise and fall of Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund that nearly failed in 
1998.39  LTCM opened for business in February 1994 after raising $1.25 
billion from a broad range of investors.40  LTCM, whose principals included 
prominent traders and two Nobel Prize winners,41 employed a dozen or so 
trading strategies, some of which involved convergence trades and dynamic 
hedging.42  LTCM‘s trades involved complex strategies and trades that 
numbered in the thousands.43  At one point, LTCM was reported to have 
over 60,000 trades on its books.44  LTCM‘s reputation enabled it to get cre-
dit on easy terms and facilitated its development of connections with other 
traders and financial institutions, many of whom were eager to make trades 
with LTCM.45 
LTCM‘s Treasury arbitrage trade was one of its simpler trading strate-
gies.46  This trade, in one instance, took advantage of market discounting of 
thirty-year U.S. Treasury bonds, which created an unexpectedly wide 
spread in yields.47  In 1994, betting that this spread would narrow, LTCM 
bought $1 billion in bonds that its models suggested were undervalued by 
the market (the cheaper Treasury bonds), and sold short $1 billion in bonds 





  See generally PATTERSON, supra note 26, at 87, 93, 99, 106, 114, 115, 128, 138, 151, 155, 194. 
39
  PRESIDENT‘S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF 
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 12–14 (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter PWG] (describing LTCM‘s near 
failure) (link). 
40
  ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT 39 (2000). 
41
  Id. at 116–17 (noting that 1997 Nobel Laureate in Economics winners Robert C. Merton and My-
ron Scholes were among the principals at LTCM); PWG, supra note 39, at 10 (―LTCM‘s principals in-
cluded individuals with substantial reputations in the financial markets and especially in the economic 
theory of financial markets.‖). 
42
  See generally EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
SPECULATION 339 (2000) (noting that convergence trading is ―a backward-looking type of speculation 
based on an extrapolation of historic price patterns‖); PWG, supra note 39, at 10 & nn.13, 14 (noting 
that ―LTCM sought to profit from a variety of trading strategies, including convergence trades and dy-
namic hedging,‖ and describing convergence trading (relative value arbitrage) as ―the practice of taking 
offsetting positions in two related securities in the hopes that the price gap between the two securities 
will move in a favorable direction‖ and dynamic hedging as ―the practice of managing nonlinear price 
risk exposure (i.e., from options) through active rebalancing of underlying positions, rather than by ar-
ranging offsetting hedges directly‖). 
43
  PWG, supra note 39,. at 46. 
44
  Id. at 11. 
45
  LOWENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 46–47. 
46
  Id. at 45. 
47
  Id. at 43 (―In 1994, Long-Term noticed that this spread was unusually wide.  The February 1993 
issue was trading at a yield of 7.36 percent.  The bond issued six months later, in August, was yielding 
only 7.24 percent, or 12 basis points, less.‖). 
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sive Treasury bonds).48  To pay for the cheaper bonds, LTCM borrowed 
money from several Wall Street banks and borrowed the more expensive 
bonds that it sold short.49  LTCM also loaned the bonds that it bought to 
other Wall Street firms, who wired cash to LTCM as collateral for the 
loaned bonds.50  This series of transactions enabled LTCM to make the $2 
billion Treasury arbitrage trades without using any of its own cash.  Main-
taining the trade would cost LTCM a few basis points per month if rates 
moved as contemplated by LTCM, but could potentially cost far more if 
rates moved in an unanticipated manner.51 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York orchestrated the rescue of 
LTCM by a private bailout and recapitalization in the aftermath of bond 
market volatility surrounding the 1998 Russian debt default, due to fears 
about the potential market impact of an LTCM collapse.52  A clear harbin-
ger of the later credit crisis, LTCM had leverage of greater than 100-to-1 
just prior to its almost $4 billion bailout.53  Internal risk management mod-
els at LTCM were insufficient in the face of adverse market conditions in 
1998.  With more capital, however, LTCM might have withstood the ad-
verse market conditions. 
As was the case with LTCM in 1998, internal risk management at 
many financial market firms was not well-positioned to cope with the mar-





  Id. at 44; RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 369 (9th ed. 2008) (noting that a person selling short holds the view that a stock 
price will decline).  Short selling is typically accomplished as follows: the person selling short borrows 
shares from an investor, sells the shares, waits for the price to decline so that the stock can be repur-
chased at a price lower than the original sale price, and returns the borrowed shares to the initial lending 
investor. 
49
  LOWENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 44–45. 
50
  Id. at 45. 
51
  Id. (noting that LTCM also substantially reduced or refused to take haircuts or post collateral on 
the bonds it borrowed). 
52
  See id. at 207–208 (noting that new equity of $3.6 billion was contributed in exchange for 90 per-
cent equity in LTCM); PWG, supra note 39, at 12 (―The LTCM Fund‘s size and leverage, as well as the 
trading strategies that it utilized, made it vulnerable to the extraordinary financial market conditions that 
emerged following Russia‘s devaluation of the ruble and declaration of a debt moratorium on August 17 
of last year.  Russia‘s actions sparked a ‗flight to quality‘ in which investors avoided risk and sought out 
liquidity.‖); Joseph G. Haubrich, Some Lessons on the Rescue of Long-Term Capital Management (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland Discussion Paper No. 19, 2007) (describing the full history and details of 
LTCM‘s rescue by the Federal Reserve Bank) (link). 
53
  LOWENSTEIN, supra note 40, at 191. 
54
  See, e.g., CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Government Reform, 110th Cong. 166 (2008) (testimony of Charles Prince, former Chairman and CEO, 
Citigroup) (―Last fall, it became apparent that the risk models which Citigroup, the various rating agen-
cies, and the rest of the financial community used to assess certain mortgage-backed securities were 
wrong.‖); see generally James Surowiecki, That Uncertain Feeling, NEWYORKER.COM, Sept. 1, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/09/01/080901ta_talk_surowiecki (discussing market vo-
latility in 2008, noting that ―[p]recipitous falls in the market have frequently been followed immediately 
by sharp rallies, and vice versa.‖) (link). 
104:398 (2010) The Credit Crisis and Failure: Part I 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/14/ 407 
successfully endure such volatility has been hindered by a number of fac-
tors, including inadequate risk management, high leverage, and compensa-
tion structures that may have encouraged speculation and incentivized risky 
trading.  Further, misuses of mathematical models also contributed to the 
credit crisis.55  The Gaussian copula function, which was developed by Da-
vid X. Li,56 a Wall Street math wizard, was widely used by various financial 
market participants, gatekeepers, and regulators to model complex financial 
market risks.57  Li, who has an M.A. in the actuarial sciences and a Ph.D. in 
statistics, reflects a typical trajectory in the ―quant‖ era, during which Wall 
Street firms hired Ph.D.s in math and physics to create, price, and arbitrage 
increasingly complex securities.58  The Li formula addresses the problem of 
modeling default correlation, which is an important factor in pricing com-
plex securities and assessing risk.59  The importance of modeling default 
correlation is obvious, for example, in the case of LTCM‘s treatment of so-
vereign bonds.  An investor who is investing in Russian and Mexican bonds 
needs to understand the extent to which a Russian default might be corre-
lated with a Mexican default.60  LTCM failed in part because its models, 
which were based on 100 years of historical data, assumed no correlation 
between a Russian and Mexican default.61  Contrary to LTCM‘s models, in 
1998 a Russian and Mexican default were correlated, and because both 
markets included many of the same investors, the Russian default led many 
investors to sell their Mexican bonds as they attempted to lower the risk le-
vels in their portfolios.62  The Russian devaluation and default on certain 
borrowings ultimately contributed to the collapse of LTCM.63 
Li‘s Gaussian copula model was innovative in that it allowed modeling 
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stead, Li‘s model used historic CDS spreads to model default correlation.65  
A CDS price increase thus would be reflected as an increase in default risk 
in Li‘s formula.66  Li‘s formula and variants based on it were widely 
adopted by industry participants and credit rating agencies, were used to 
price billions of dollars of CDOs, and contributed to increases in CDO and 
CDS activity.67  Reliance upon and widespread use of Li‘s formula contri-
buted to the credit crisis in part because those making asset allocation deci-
sions on Wall Street were not quants and did not really understand the 
formula‘s limitations and weaknesses.68  Further, mathematical models that 
could render some measurable (even if incorrect) output also may have lent 
―credibility and false precision to the dismal reality of risk management.‖69 
Use of derivatives may also have changed the ways investment profes-
sionals frame risk.  Wall Street firms that created CDOs and other complex 
derivatives may have lessened due diligence and risk assessment of their 
creations because they assumed that a liquid market would exist.70  Risk as-
sessments were shaped by incomplete market assumptions.71  Therefore, 
significant gaps existed in widely used industry risk management models,72 
particularly with respect to liquidity risk, which was underpriced.73  Gaps in 
risk models and risk management reflected an incomplete understanding of 
financial networks and the full implications of trading credit derivatives and 
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The speed of credit crisis contagion also took many by surprise.75  Fur-
ther, the credit crisis unfolded along with changes to accounting rules for 
derivatives that require fair value (i.e., mark-to-market) reporting in compa-
ny financial statements, which likely increased financial statement volatili-
ty.76  Financial statement volatility may result from fair value accounting 
because assets and liabilities may need to be reported based on some meas-
ure of market value rather than historical cost measures.77 
Derivatives are an important part of hedging activities and proprietary 
and client trading operations for a wide variety of market actors, particular-
ly investment and commercial banks and hedge funds.  On Wall Street, for 
example, ―trading firms routinely borrow as much as 50 times the cash in 
their accounts to trade complex financial instruments such as derivatives.‖78  
The extensive leverage used in derivatives trading, however, may magnify 
risk.79  In the credit crisis, leverage was an important factor in financial in-
stitution instability because many financial institutions were engaged in 
high-risk trading activities, did not have sufficient capital to withstand a 
market decline, and found it difficult to raise additional capital due to li-
quidity constraints in a frozen credit market.80 
The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group III (CRMPG) is a 
group of industry participants tasked with providing a private sector re-
sponse to the credit crisis.81  The CRMPG has identified four forces that of-
ten are common denominators in financial contagion: credit concentrations, 
maturity mismatches, excessive leverage on balance sheets or embedded in 
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ity.82  These factors all played a role in the credit crisis and contributed to its 
spread through the same networks that connected market participants during 
more favorable market conditions.  The credit crisis thus illuminates impor-
tant perils of networked financial markets and some downside risks of fi-
nancial innovation.83 
B. Industry Inoculation: Financial Market Loss Prevention and Risk 
Spreading 
Because many financial market firms were heavily leveraged with in-
sufficient capital, the consequences of failed risk management did not re-
main internalized within these firms.  Rather, the costs of failed risk 
management have been externalized and borne by the general public.  As 
many commentators have noted, this suggests the need for additional regu-
lation to internalize these externalities,84 in part by imposing serious conse-
quences for failure. 
The Goldman Sachs ―Abacus‖ transactions illustrate how trading activ-
ities may exacerbate systemic risk.  On April 16, 2010, the SEC brought 
fraud charges against Goldman Sachs in connection with Abacus 2007-AC1 
synthetic CDOs that Goldman marketed and structured.85  In contrast to 
cash CDOs, which contain portfolios of assets, synthetic CDOs reference an 
underlying portfolio of CDSs that may relate to the same types of assets that 
might be included in a cash CDO.86  Synthetic CDOs are far faster and easi-
er to assemble than cash CDOs, and have contributed to growth in credit 
derivatives markets.  Abacus 2007-AC1 was a $2 billion notional value 
synthetic CDO that referenced a portfolio of Residential Mortgage Backed 
Securities (RMBS).87  Investors in the Abacus synthetic CDO included 
ABN Amro, which was later acquired by a group of banks that included the 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS).88  RBS ultimately paid Goldman more than 
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ernment-controlled.89  Similarly, German bank IKB Deutsche Industriebank 
AG purchased $150 million of Abacus synthetic CDOs in April 2007 and 
lost most of its investment within months of its purchase.90  It nearly failed 
in 2007 before a rescue from its main shareholder, state-owned KfW Bank-
engruppe.91  Synthetic CDOs magnified risk because they enabled market 
participants to place bets on the residential housing market that were far 
larger than the original market itself.  By the end of 2006, although only 
$1.2 billion in subprime mortgages were outstanding, more than $5 trillion 
in investments had been created based on risky subprime loans.92  AIG, 
which received over $120 billion in bailouts from the U.S. government, in-
sured $6 billion in Goldman-arranged Abacus deals.93  A number of Abacus 
investors, including AIG, IKB, and RBS, were recipients of government 
bailouts.94  The systemic impact of these types of trading activities and the 
potential for negative societal externalities are significant concerns in the 
aftermath of the credit crisis. 
Regulation and internal risk management should share the goal of con-
taining negative externalities that may flow from trading and other financial 
market activities.  In addition to regulatory changes, credit crisis policy res-
ponses should strongly encourage financial market participants to manage 
risk collectively through mechanisms such as insurance and industry bailout 
pools that may help to spread risks of financial market activities among 
market participants.  Models from other arenas could provide a starting 
point for shaping financial market participants‘ efforts to develop mechan-
isms to prevent the externalization of their losses to broader society.  Such 
models could be developed in conjunction with regulatory mechanisms in-
tended to manage risk.  Although implementing industry-sponsored models 
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ing the impact of future market crises that such models offer makes those 
efforts worthwhile.  In addition to potentially mitigating systemic risk, or 
risks to the financial system as a whole,95 these models could also force pri-
vate market discipline by creating regulatory frameworks that permit even 
large or highly-networked market players to fail.  This likely will provide 
better incentives for more comprehensive internal industry risk manage-
ment. 
Additional forms of market insurance might supplement existing fi-
nancial market insurance programs available through the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which insures bank deposits, and the Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), which insures broker-dealer 
accounts.96  In financial markets more generally, varied insurance mechan-
isms could be used to ameliorate risk in capital market contexts.  Just as the 
availability of insurance for investors reflects regulatory concern for retail 
market participants, industry insurance schemes would reflect acknowl-
edgment that even sophisticated market participants may need to insure 
against risks of the sort that led to the credit crisis.  Large law firms in the 
United States offer a potential model for self-insurance, even though it is 
not likely to be completely transferable to the capital market context.  The 
Attorneys‘ Liability Assurance Society (ALAS) was founded in 1979.97  
ALAS membership includes 236 firms and 60,000 lawyers in forty-five 
states and the District of Columbia, with total assets of over $1.9 billion.98  
Membership in ALAS is subject to careful ALAS underwriting, which in-
cludes ―on-site underwriting reviews and significant scrutiny‖ prior to ac-
ceptance.99  ALAS also makes recommendations concerning law firm 
structure and procedures.100 
Insurance will not, by itself, solve potential problems related to risk, 
but could spread risk and supplement risk firewalls in the event of broad, 
systemic problems or network failure.  Insurance mechanisms may help to 
implement the private market discipline that remains the core goal of U.S. 





  See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 196 (2008) (describing ―a 
great deal of confusion about what types of risk are truly ‗systemic‘—the term meaning ‗[o]f or pertain-
ing to a system‘—and what types of systemic risk should be regulated.‖) (link). 
96
  See, e.g., GAO, SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: STEPS NEEDED TO BETTER DISCLOSE SIPC 
POLICIES TO INVESTORS 3 (2001) (―The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA) created the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to provide certain protections against losses to cus-
tomers from the failure of a securities firm.‖) (link); see also George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 
FDICIA After Five Years, 11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 139 (1997) (describing generally the functions of 
the FDIC). 
97
  ALAS Website, http://www.alas.com/about.shtml (last visited May 10, 2010) (link). 
98
  Id. 
99
  Standard & Poor‘s, RatingsDirect, Attorneys‘ Liability Assurance Society (Bermuda) Ltd. and 
Attorneys‘ Liability Assurance Society Inc. RRG 4 (May 19, 2009), http://www.alas.com/sp.pdf (link). 
100
  SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE 38 
(2002). 
104:398 (2010) The Credit Crisis and Failure: Part I 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/14/ 413 
courage or require use of more industry insurance mechanisms in financial 
markets. 
Establishing clearinghouses similar to those in the commodities arena 
might be another avenue for monitoring and reducing risk.  Clearinghouses 
have been suggested for CDS markets.101  Industry-sponsored bailout pools 
may be another industry-based mechanism for promoting the internalization 
of risk by financial market participants.102  Payments into the bailout fund 
could follow an agreed-upon formula that might reflect an incremental fee 
attached to certain types of financial market activities103 or could involve 
compensation holdbacks from employee bonuses.  Regulators could moni-
tor the composition of any payouts from such private bailout funds.  The 
goal of industry-sponsored bailouts would be to establish firewalls around 
troubled or failed participating financial institutions and to execute any ne-
cessary financial rescues using funds from financial market participants ra-
ther than the general public.104  Further, schemes organized by financial ser-
services market participants that are subject to external regulatory oversight 
and monitoring are likely to be far more effective than direct external regu-
lation, particularly with respect to management of complex risks.105 
C. Risky Business and Regulatory Mismatch: Internal Risk Management 
and Fragmented External Regulation 
Risk management in financial markets may be hindered by the current 
design of U.S. financial market regulatory architecture.  Indeed, in 2008 the 
U.S. Treasury Department characterized the structure of U.S. financial mar-
ket regulation as ―largely incompatible with [capital] market develop-
ments.‖106  The financial services industry has seen a significant 
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recent years.107  Unfortunately, regulatory architecture in the United States 
has not adapted to reflect changing industry configurations.  Rather, U.S. 
regulatory architecture has remained complex and fragmented108 in the face 
of industry ―consolidation,‖ ―conglomeration,‖ and ―convergence.‖109   
Regulatory fragmentation makes collaboration among various regula-
tors difficult.110  In the futures and securities arena, for example, prior to the 
credit crisis, multiple regulatory authorities were responsible for regulating 
different aspects of financial markets.  These authorities included the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which had jurisdiction over securi-
ties, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which had 
jurisdiction over futures.111  The SEC and the CFTC split regulatory juris-
diction over derivatives.112  Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives were large-
ly unregulated due to the provisions of the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (CFMA).113  Regulatory treatment of OTC derivatives is, 
however, likely to change, and a number of post-credit crisis legislative and 
policy proposals would impose greater regulation on OTC derivatives mar-
kets.114 
Although some market participants such as broker-dealers are more 
heavily regulated,115 other significant market actors, such as hedge funds, 
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APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 210 (2008) (noting that ―[t]he complex 
array of supervisory agencies [in the United States] requires a high degree of coordination‖). 
111
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(2000) (link). 
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  See id. (describing SEC and CFTC shared jurisdiction and jurisdictional disputes over security 
futures). 
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  See Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365 to -461 (2000) (amending Com-
modity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C §§ 1–8609 (2006)). 
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them to be lightly regulated under separate regimes from multiple federal 
regulators.116  A number of self-regulatory organizations (SROs), including 
the stock exchanges and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, also 
have regulated in the securities and futures arenas, subject in turn to addi-
tional regulatory oversight.117  The large number of financial market regula-
tors and regulatory regimes in the United States underscores that more 
regulation does not necessarily lead to better regulation.  Rather, this regu-
latory landscape has led to significant regulatory fragmentation and has also 
contributed to regulatory gaps and failures that diminish the effectiveness of 
regulatory frameworks.  Furthermore, existing regulatory overlaps are high-
ly inefficient. 
While the SEC/CFTC regulatory split reflects the historical origins of 
futures in the agricultural sector and stock markets in the financial sector,118 
the split makes little sense in a world of hybrid financial instruments and 
increasingly converged and networked securities and commodities mar-
kets.119  Prior to the credit crisis, banking regulation was similarly frag-
mented, distributed among multiple state regulators and five federal 
banking regulators.120  Insurance regulation remained the responsibility of 
the states, and therefore similarly lacked cohesion.121  ―Regulators have at-





  See Arewa, supra note 4, at 30–32 (describing how hedge funds may be subject to SEC, CFTC 
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National Futures Association, a futures industry self-regulatory organization (SRO)). 
117
  See GAO, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE 
OVERSIGHT OF SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS 1 (2007) (link); G30, supra note 110, at 213 (dis-
cussing the role of SROs, in the U.S. securities and futures industry regulations, of establishing and en-
forcing rules governing member conduct and trading, monitoring trading activity to prevent market 
manipulation, and examining members for financial strength). 
118
  See TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 2, at 45 (explaining that the Department of Agriculture 
initially had federal jurisdiction over futures markets and that congressional CFTC oversight remains 
vested in the Senate and House Agricultural Committees); WILLIAM G. FERRIS, THE GRAIN TRADERS: 
THE HISTORY OF THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE (1988) (discussing the origins of the Chicago Board 
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  See TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 2, at 11 (―The realities of the current marketplace have 
significantly diminished, if not entirely eliminated, the original reason for the regulatory bifurcation be-
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mentation through interagency cooperation,‖ but fragmentation still exists 
within individual regulatory bodies.122 
In contrast to the United States, where regulatory frameworks reflect 
early twentieth century designs, other countries have modernized their fi-
nancial services regulatory frameworks.  In the United Kingdom, for exam-
ple, a single primary regulator oversees financial markets, while a separate 
regulator ensures financial stability.123  When Australia recently modernized 
its financial services regulatory structure, it adopted a Twin Peaks regula-
tion-by-objective model,124 and now has two primary financial market regu-
lators, a separate system stability regulator, and another regulator that 
focuses on nonfinancial market conduct and consumer protection.125  U.S. 
financial market oversight is based on functional regulators whose opera-
tional spheres track industry institutional structures of prior eras,126 which 
leads to ineffective and inefficient regulatory frameworks.  Fixing financial 
market regulatory shortcomings will require legislation that transforms fi-
nancial industry oversight in fundamental ways. 
The potential complexity of regulatory requirements has significant 
implications for financial services firms, which may need to deal with mul-
tiple regulators and requirements.  Further, existing U.S. financial market 
regulatory structures are not well suited to the pervasive trading activities 
that currently characterize financial markets and do not effectively regulate 
such activities.  In this trading-centered universe, the activities of individual 
market players are not easily located within the existing scope of regulatory 
enforcement.  AIG, for example, ―a heavily regulated insurance company at 
both the federal and state level, has subsidiaries that have been major issu-
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product that is a significant force in financial markets.‖128  ―Although AIG 
is an insurance company whose main insurance subsidiaries are regulated 
by the states in which they do business,‖129 prior to the credit crisis, AIG‘s 
holding company and subsidiaries were also subject to prudential federal 
banking oversight by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) because AIG 
has a federal savings bank subsidiary.130  The extensive and layered regula-
tion of AIG ―failed to avert its near collapse and need for a government bai-
lout and takeover.‖131  The regulation of AIG illustrates core features of the 
U.S. financial regulation frameworks that typically determine regulatory 
oversight by a combination of functional and institutional factors.  Under 
this typical regulatory framework, regulatory classifications are sometimes 
given more importance than the nature of the activities occurring within a 
firm. 
The flurry of reform proposals following the credit crisis reflects wide-
spread recognition that the existing financial market regulatory architecture 
is not a good fit for current financial market system dynamics.  However, 
the enactment of yet more regulation is unlikely to do much to prevent the 
next crisis.  Financial market regulatory frameworks should continually be 
evaluated to ensure that they are both effective and efficient.  Moreover, the 
inefficient and patchwork U.S. system is costly for regulated entities.  The 
fact that the current crisis unfolded within entities that are subject to signifi-
cant regulation does not bode well for the ability of existing frameworks 
and regulators to identify and create firewalls around sectors or entities that 
threaten market integrity.  The fragmented nature of financial markets regu-
lation makes an accurate assessment of systemic risk difficult, because each 
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Further, regulatory coordination with respect to systemic risk management 





  See, e.g., Arewa, supra note 4, at 28–29 (noting the regulatory turf battle between the SEC and 
the CFTC over securities and futures regulation). 
